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The Rise and Fall of the Multilateral Agreement
on Investment: Where Now?
PETER

T.

MUCHLINSKI*

The increasing integration of global business through both international trade and foreign direct investment (FD1), conducted in the main by multinational enterprises (MNE),
has given rise to a new agenda of regulatory questions. In the pursuit of answers to these
questions, new regimes, by which international business can flourish, may develop. At the
same time, not only business and economic issues but also social issues arise. These include,
at a minimum: protection of the environment, observance of minimum labour and human
rights standards, and development of the least developed countries and regions.' Such matters raise further questions going to the heart of the type of regime that will emerge. Will
such a regime be limited to a narrow, "top down" economic model aimed at the progressive
liberalisation of trade and investment rules incorporating what some have termed a "New
Constitutionalism" that imposes discipline on public institutions to prevent national interference with the property right, and entry and exit options of mobile corporate capital?2 In
the alternative, will it offer a "bottom up" approach in which the interests of societies at
large, in the good governance of private enterprise, will be protected alongside economic
liberalisation through the regulation, by nation states and intergovernmental organisations,
of the types of social issues listed above? This debate raises the core question of how to
establish a politically acceptable balance between business liberalisation and legitimate social regulation by public institutions. The present paper aims to contribute to that debate
by examining the rise and fall of the draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAl),
which was negotiated unsuccessfully under the auspices of the Organization for Economic

*Drapers' Professor of Law, Department of Law, Queen Mary and Westfield College, University ofLondon,
England. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Schmitthoff Symposium, Law and Trade in the
2 11 Century, June 3, 2000, Queen Mary and Westfield College, London. I am grateful for comments from
Stefan Amarasinha, Sol Picciotto, and Rory Sullivan. Responsibility for remaining errors and omissions is mine
alone.
1. See Kofi Annan, Development of Guidelines on the Role and Social Responsibilities of the Private Sector:
Report of the Secretary-General, Address at the World Economic Forum (Jan. 31, 1999); U.N. GAOR,
Doc. A/AC.253/21 (2000) (transcript available in U.N. Doc. SG/SM/6881/Rev.1).
2. See Stephen Gill, Globalisation,Market Civilization and DisciplinaryNeo-Liberalism, 24 MILLENNIUM 399,
413 (1995).
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Co-operation and Development (OECD). Furthermore, it should be noted that the proposed adoption of multilateral investment rules in the Millenium Round of multilateral
trade negotiations was also opposed by several delegations, and by civil society groups, at
the World Trade Organization (WTO) Seattle Ministerial in November 1999.1
Accordingly, a close examination of why such rules have been virtually impossible to
negotiate (notwithstanding the present trend towards the liberalisation of national investment laws and regulations 4) should offer insights into what needs to be done for a future
multilateral investment regime to be successfully put into place. Despite the failure of the
Seattle Ministerial, the British government and the European Commission continue to
favour the adoption of multilateral investment rules by the WTO as part of a comprehensive
round of negotiations that would not only consider trade and investment but also include
competition policy, government procurement, industrial tariffs, labour rights, and the environment.5 However, even if investment does not appear on any future negotiating agenda,
the issues raised by the MAI will continue to influence developments in bilateral and regional investment negotiations. Therefore, an understanding of its shortcomings is useful
in a more general context.
This paper contains three sections. Section I considers the background to international
negotiations for International Investment Agreements (IIA). The MAI has a clear historical
lineage, which shows the problems involved in trying to conclude an HA, and which helps
to account in part for its failure. Section II looks at the contents of the MAI, focusing on
the major issues that caused the negotiations to stumble. Section III draws together some
conclusions from the preceding sections and considers what lessons can be learned from
them.
I. The Background to the MAI
Demands for international business protection and regulation are far older than one
might imagine. 6 In regard to trade and investment in colonial territories, such demands
would not have been made in the context of international law. The control over colonial
laws, regulations, and administration exercised by the political and executive institutions of
the imperial sovereign could ensure the requisite degree oflegal and administrative certainty
for an effective reduction of business risk. This control would be backed up, where necessary, by imperial military power. On the other hand, in relation to non-colonial territories,
the maintenance of a system of order that could reduce business risk was more problematic.
The use of direct force was an option and was, on numerous occasions, applied. However,
such direct action could not stand the scrutiny of a more modern political order based on
the rule of law. Thus, it is not surprising to find that new principles of international law,
dealing with the treatment of aliens and their property, began to emerge from the state
practice of the principal Western powers in relation to disputes with independent countries

3. See John Vidal, Secret World of WTO Deal Makers, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 3, 1999, at 1-2.
4. See World Investment Report 1999 at 115-17, U.N. Doc. TD/UNCTADIWIR/1999.
5. See Clare Short, Lifting One Billion People out of Poverty: The Role of Trade and Investment, Address at
UNCTAD X Bangkok (Feb. 16, 2000); EC Commission Seattle Conference Preparation:ECApproach to Trade and
Investment (Apr. 2000), availableat http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/2000round/1806i.htm.
6. See Peter T. Muchlinski, A Brief History of Regulation, in REGULATING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: BEYOND
LIBERALISATION 47 (Sol Picciotto & Ruth Mayne eds., 1999).
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that were hosts to foreign traders and investors.7 The aim was to establish rules that would
be binding on such host countries as subjects of international law. The presence of such
rules would ensure a degree of proper conduct towards traders and investors from the
Western powers through the threat of international claims by these powers of violations of
such rules by host countries.
From this practice emerged the concept of international minimum standards of treatment
for aliens and their property, developed in the nineteenth century by the major western
European powers and the United States.' Two principles in particular stand out: first, the
property of foreigners could not be taken without due process of law and without prompt,
full, and effective compensation; second, contractual relations entered into between host
states and private foreign investors were to be accorded the utmost respect, requiring the
preservation of the bargain even where its terms proved to be disadvantageous to the host
state.
These principles were challenged by a number of political and associated legal developments. Thus, the independence movement in Latin America in the nineteenth century
gave rise to the Calvo Doctrine. This doctrine influenced Latin American resistance to
international minimum standards in the late nineteenth century and much of the twentieth
century, on the basis that foreign investors were entitled to treatment no better than that
accorded to domestic investors. Secondly, the rise of socialism and its delegitimation of
private property rights helped to undermine the accepted Western views of the sanctity of
contract and property. Thirdly, the decolonisation movement in Europe after World War I
and in Africa and Asia after World War II led to greater demands for economic self-determination and, with it, a reinforcement of the state's sovereign right to regulate national
economic policy within its borders.
The result of these challenges generated uncertainty as to the content of customary
international law in the field of foreign investment. This uncertainty was reinforced in the
early 1970s by demands for greater control over national economic policy made by the
developing countries under the New International Economic Order. However, one area
has remained certain: all states have accepted the right to control the entry and establishment of foreign investors into the territory of the receiving state unless the latter is bound
by treaty to accord such rights to investors.9
Amid such growing uncertainty, attempts have been made since the late 1920s to develop
an agreed international code for the regulation of foreign investor/host state relations.' 0
These can be divided between attempts to conclude a binding international investor protection convention and attempts to reconcile the interests of investors for protection with
the interests of states to control investors acting in the national interest.
In the first category, there were numerous unsuccessful initiatives undertaken by the
League of Nations between 1929 and 1930. However, the most influential initiative came
from private sector interests in the United Kingdom and Germany, which led to the conclusion of the "Abs-Shawcross" draft convention in 1959. This convention was taken up by
7. See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 8 (1994).
8. See CHARLES LIPSON, STANDING GUARD: PROTECTING FOREIGN CAPITAL IN THE NINETEENTH

AND TWEN-

(1985).
9. See Admission and Establishment, 1999 UNCTAD Series on Issues in International InvestmentAgreements
at 7-14, U.N. Doc. TD/UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/10/Vol. H [hereinafter Admission and Establishment].
10. See, e.g., PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 573 (rev. ed., 1999); Muchlinski, supra note 6.
TIETH CENTURIES
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the then Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), now OECD, for
consideration. It led to the OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property
of 1962." However, this draft was never adopted, due to opposition from the less developed
south European Member countries. In 1967, the Council of the OECD, by a resolution
adopted on October 12, 1967, commended the draft convention to Member States as a
model for bilateral investment protection treaties (BIT) and as a basis for ensuring the
observance of the principles of international law that it contained. Such bilateral treatiesof which there are in excess of 1,300-have been highly influential in the development of
investor protection standards and may be regarded as a significant source of such standards
for the MAI L" Indeed, the MAI was often "sold" as a "multilateralisation" of BITs with
some additional provisions.
Alongside the abortive attempt to adopt the Convention, the OECD also initiated a
policy on the progressive liberalisation of capital flows under the Codes of Liberalisation
of Capital Movements and Current Invisible Operations of 1961.'1 These instruments committed the members to the progressive removal of barriers to cross-border capital transactions as specified in the Liberalisation Lists appended to each Code. Of particular importance to the future development of the MAI was the 1984 introduction of a right of
establishment into the Code on Capital Movements.14 This was based on a prohibition
against the maintenance or introduction of regulations or practices in relation to the granting of licences, concessions, or similar authorisations, including conditions or requirements
attached to such authorisations, that would affect the operations of enterprises by raising
special barriers or limitations with respect to nonresident as compared to resident investors,
and that have the intent or effect of preventing or significantly impeding inward direct
investment by nonresidents.
More recent developments that have also provided sources for MAI provisions include
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which exemplifies the North American model of investor promotion and protection with its distinctive feature of including
pre-entry as well as post-entry protection for foreign investors; the 1994 Energy Charter
Treaty (ECT), an experiment in multilateral standard-setting for trade and investment in
a specific industrial sector; and the 1994 WTO Agreements dealing with investment-related
issues, namely, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIP), and the agreement on Trade
Related Investment Measures (TRIM). In addition, there have been some notable institutional developments, adopted under the auspices of the World Bank, aimed at furthering
the protection of investors. These include the 1965 Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, 5 which
11. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Draft Convention on the Protection of
Foreign Property, Oct. 12, 1967, O.E.C.D. Pub. No. 23081, 7 I.L.M. 5.
12. See generally BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES IN THE MID-1990S, U.N. Doc. TD/UNCTAD/ITE/
IIT/7 (1998).
13. OECD CODE oF LIBERALISATION OF CURRENT INVISIBLE OPERATIONS, OECD/C(61)95 (1977); OECD
CODE OF LIRERALISATION OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS, OECD/C(61)96 (1990).
14. CODE OF LIBERALISATION OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS, at Annex A, available at http://www.oecd.org/
daf/investment/legal-instruments/clcmoper.htm.
15. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) would be one option under the
MAI. The aim was to offer the investor a variety of options including the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) arbitration rules and recourse to the ICC. See infra notes 64-70 and
accompanying text.
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provided a possible model for the dispute settlement provisions of the MAI, and the 1985
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency Convention.
In the second category, the most significant historical example is the Charter of the
International Trade Organisation (Havana Charter) completed on March 24, 1948, in Havana, Cuba. 16 The Havana Charter contained a number of provisions relevant to the regulation of foreign investment by corporations, including proposals for the control of restrictive business practices, provisions protecting the security of foreign investments, and an
assertion of the right of capital-importing states to control the conditions of entry and
establishment, of inward investment. These provisions caused widespread opposition to the
Havana Charter among business interests and led to its demise when the United States and
other signatory states did not ratify it.1"
More recently, in the 1970s, numerous negotiations commenced for the adoption of
codes of conduct for MINEs. International organisations began to accept the legitimacy of
claims by capital-importing states for greater control over the conditions of entry and establishment and over the subsequent conduct of foreign investors within their territory.
The balancing of the interests of private foreign investors and those of the host state, first
attempted in the abortive Havana Charter, became the basis for these new codes of conduct
for MINEs. The most significant initiative was the UN Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations.1 It was never adopted. Nonetheless, its contents continue to inform
the debate on how corporate responsibility issues should be formulated in HAs. 19 More
successful was the ILO initiative, which led to the 1977 adoption of the ILO Tripartite
Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy.20
Equally in 1976, the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises were adopted. These
contain the most comprehensive set of responsibilities for MNEs but are not legally binding. They should be read alongside the OECD Declaration on International Investment
and Multinational Enterprises, which contains references to national treatment and international law. These guidelines have just been revised, and the new version was adopted at
the end of June 2000.21 Finally, mention should be made of the 1992 World Bank Guidelines
on the Treatment of Foreign Investment. These guidelines are aimed at investor protection,
but significantly, they accept the right of host states to control the entry and establishment
of foreign investors.22
H. The MAI and Its Failure
The history of discussions regarding the rights of investors and their protection has raised
a number of hitherto unresolved issues concerning multilateral investment rules: should

16. See UNCTAD INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
TD/UNCTAD/DTC/30/Vol. I. (1996) [hereinafter
17. See Lipson, supra note 8, at 86-87.
18. See COMPENDIUM, supra note 16, at 161-80.

INSTRUMENTS:

A

COMPENDIUM at 3-13,

U.N. Doc.

COMPENDIUM].

19. See, e.g., Report (1998) of the Working Group on the Relationship Betveen Trade and Investment to the General
Council, at 51-62 T 191-225, WVTO Doc. WT/WGTI/2 (1998).
20. See COMPENDIUM, supra note 16, at 89-103.
available at
ENTERPRISES--Text (2000),
FOR MULTINATIONAL
21. See OECD GUIDELINES
http://www.oecd.org/ daf/investment/guidelines/mnetext.htm.
22. See COMPENDIUM, supra note 16, at 247-55; Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, The World Bank Guidelines on
the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, in LEGAL ASPECTSOF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 87 (Daniel D.
Bradlow & Alfred Escher eds., 1999).

FALL 2000

1038

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

these tend towards investor protection alone, or towards a balance between protection and
regulation; should they be binding or voluntary; should investors be offered privileged
treatment based on international minimum standards, or only the same treatment as national investors? It has been argued that these debates have been overcome by events, in
that the contemporary environment is more suited to the successful creation of a new
multilateral regime for investor protection, as a result of shifts towards liberalisation, privatisation, and the recognition of the utility of inward direct investment by transnational
corporations as a source of capital and technology.3 The MAI is undoubtedly a product of
this conviction.14 According to the Report of the Committee on International Investment
and Multinational Enterprises and the Committee on Capital Movements and Invisible
Transactions:
The MAI would build on the achievements of the present OECD instruments, consolidating
and strengthening existing commitments under the Codes of Liberalisation and the 1976 Declaration and Decisions on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises. The aim
of the negotiations is to conclude an agreement incorporating rollback, standstill, national
treatment and non-discrimination/most favoured nation (MFN) as well as new disciplines to
improve market access and to strengthen the basis of mutual confidence between enterprises
and states. The liberalization obligations would be complemented by provisions on investment
protection. The obligations under the agreement would need to be reinforced by effective
dispute settlement procedures .... The agreement would be comprehensive in scope, covering
all sectors under a broad definition of investment focusing mainly on [foreign direct investment]. The MAI would aim to raise the level of existing liberalization based on a "top-down"
approach under which the only exceptions permitted are those listed when adhering to the
agreement and which are subject to progressive liberalization.25
Thus, the draft MAI was based on earlier models ofbinding investor protection standards,
leading it to be crafted as an investor and investment protection and promotion agreement,
similar in type to the first category of agreements and instruments mentioned above. This
was notwithstanding the proposed inclusion of the OECD Guidelines on Multinational
Enterprises in a nonbinding Annex, coupled with a "no lowering of standards" clause, in
relation to labour and environmental issues. While these provisions would offer some indication of the types of obligations MNEs had towards the states in which they operated,
and of the need for host states not to compete for inward FDI on the basis of lowering
regulatory standards in the above-mentioned areas, the essential leaning of the MAI towards
investor rights and protection could not be disputed. It would prove to be a major cause of
the failure of the negotiations.
At the outset, significant obstacles to the successful conclusion of such an instrument
were identified.26 Of the many obstacles encountered in the negotiating process, the following are worthy of highlighting: the negotiating environment, the contents of the draft
MAI, and other "deal breakers" that were added to the negotiations as they progressed.

23. See Thomas W. Walde, Requiemfor the New InternationalEconomic Order: The Rise and Fall ofParadigms

in InternationalEconomic Law, in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES ARISING UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS DECADE
OFINTERNATIONAL LAW 1301 (Najeeb AI-Nauimi & Richard Meese eds., 1995).

24. See William H. Witherill, Towards an InternationalSet of Rulesforlnvestment, in TOWARDS MULTILATERAL
INVESTMENT RULES 9 and 17-30 (1996).
25. Id. at 10-11.
26. See Guy de Jonquieres, Rocky Road to Liberalisation,FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 10, 1995, at 17.

VOL. 34, NO. 3

THE RISE & FALL OF MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT
A.

1039

THE NEGOTIATING ENVIRONMENT

The origins of the OECD negotiations can be traced back to U.S. initiatives in 1991 that
called for the OECD to engage in the discussion of a wider investment instrument. This
was supported by the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD in 1992.
The United States wanted the OECD to adopt a "state-of-the-art" investment agreement
with high standards of liberalisation, investor protection, and dispute settlement procedures." Equally, calls for the institution of negotiations for a multilateral agreement on
investment came from the European Commission, which argued for the establishment of
a "level playing field" for direct investment in 1995.28 The then-EU Trade Commissioner,
Sir Leon Brittan, also gave weight to such a programme. He favoured a binding code that
would be negotiated in, and subsequently administered by, the WTO. 9 The attraction to
the WTO was threefold: first, it covered a large number of states, including developing
countries; secondly, it possessed a binding dispute settlement procedure that could give the
proposed code real legal force; and, thirdly, the EU had direct negotiating rights before
the WTO on behalf of its members. Notwithstanding EU preferences for the WTO, and
the discussion among OECD ministers in 1996 of a possible link between the OECD
negotiations and the WTO at some unspecified future time, the MAI negotiations remained
centered on the OECD. This may be explained by the fact that there would have been only
limited backing for similar negotiations in the VATO. Indeed, when the issue was mooted
at the 1996 WTO Singapore Ministerial Meeting, it was opposed by a group of developing
countries led by Egypt, India, Malaysia, and Uganda.3 0
To counter the inevitable criticism that the OECD-based negotiations were unrepresentative, the MAI was envisaged as a freestanding international treaty open to all OECD
Members, the European Communities, and to accession by non-OECD Member countries." Members would have to persuade developing countries to accept the new disciplines
and to sign on to the MAI. Thus, from the outset, the negotiating environment lacked a
comprehensive and representative body of states. This was somewhat strange, given that a
significant reason for adopting an MAI was to improve market access and investor protection in developing countries, the very group that was not represented by the OECD membership.
Finally, a major criticism of the negotiating environment came from civil society. As the
negotiations went ahead from the latter part of 1995, a significant number of nongovernmental organizations (NGO) began to take an interest. This interest was spurred by the
Internet publication of the Consolidated Negotiating Text of the MAI in August 1997.
The text was a restricted internal document that had been leaked." That, coupled with the
relative lack of publicity concerning the negotiations in the media, gave rise to a feeling

27. See Elisabeth Smythe, Your Place or Mine? States, InternationalOrganizationsand the Negotiation of lnvestment Rules, 7 TRANSNAT'L CORP. 85, 101-02 (1998).

28. A Level Playing Field for Direct Investment World-Wide, COM(95)42 final at 1, available in LEXIS
European Communities Law Library File.
29. See Guy de Jonquieres, Brittan Wants WTO Rulesfor Investment, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 19, 1995, at
4; Sir Leon Brittan, Investment Liberalisation:The Next Great Boost to the World Economy, 4 TRANSNAT'L CORP.
1 (1995).
30. See DAVID HENDERSON, THE MAI AFFAIR: A STORY AND ITS LESSONS 16 (1999); Smythe, supra note 27.

31. See Witherill, supra note 24, at 11.
32. See HENDERSON, supra note 30, at 22-23.
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that the public and interested NGOs were being excluded from the process," notwithstanding the fact that the process had been publicly announced in 1995.1 4 The initial lack of
attention to public opinion, and to the views of civil society, created an air of hostility to
the project that made it hard to justify on a political level.
B.

THE CONTENT OF THE

MAI

The draft MAI consisted of twelve major sections: the general provisions and preamble;
scope and application; treatment of investors and investments; investment protection; dispute settlement; exceptions and safeguards; financial services; taxation; country-specific exceptions; relationship with other international agreements; implementation and operation;
and final provisions." It is not possible to give a detailed analysis of all the outstanding
negotiating questions in this paper. Instead, the emphasis will be on the key controversies
that remained unresolved during the negotiations, and that may be said to have contributed
to their failure. These are the scope of the definition of "investor" and "investment"; the
extension of investor protection to the pre-entry stage and exceptions to this; the nature
and content of the nondiscrimination standard that lay at the heart of the draft MAI and
was expressed through the national treatment and most-favoured-nation (MFN) standards;
the scope of the prohibition on performance requirements; the applicable rules on expropriation; and the proposed dispute settlement provisions that would have given MNEs
direct rights to bring claims against signatory states.
1. The Definition of "Investor" and "Investment"

It is usual for an IIA to begin with a scope and definition clause. The geographical
coverage, temporal application, and subject matter of the agreement must be ascertained.
In particular, the last issue revolves around the definition of the terms "investor" and "investment." These terms give the IIA its normative content. Indeed, the definition of these
terms raises serious policy issues, and they will be the subject of hard bargaining as they
determine the extent and the manner in which the other provisions are to be applied.3 6 In
this regard, the draft MAI was no different. However, the proposed formulation of the
above terms was extremely wide. Thus, "investor" included not only nationals but also
permanent residents, as well as legal persons or other entities constituted or organised under
the applicable law of a Contracting Party. "Investment" was defined in terms of "every kind

33. See NOAM CHOMSKY, PROFIT OVERPEOPLE: NEOLIBERALISM AND GLOBAL ORDER 131-55 (1999).
34. SeeHENDERSON, supra note 30, at 18.
35. The MAI Negotiating Text (1998) DAFFE/MAI/NM (98) rev. 1, available at http://www.oecd.org/
daf/investment/fdi/mai/maitext.pdf [hereinafter MAI Consolidated Text]; Commentary to the MAI Negotiating Text (1998), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/investment/fdi/mai/maicome.pdf [hereinafterMAI Negotiating Text]. For analysis of the principal provisions, see Lessonsfrom the MAI, 1999, UNCTAD Series on
Issues in International Investment Agreements, U.N. Doc. TD/UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/ MISC.22 [hereinafter
Lessons]; Steven J. Canner, The MultilateralAgreement on Investment, 31 CORNELL INT'L LJ.657 (1998); Frans
Engering, The MultilateralInvestment Agreement, 5 TRANSNAT'L CORP. 147 (1996); Arghyrious Fatouros, Towards an InternationalAgreement on Foreign Direct Investment?, 10 ICSID-REv. FOREIGN INV. LJ.181 (1995);
Sol Picciotto, A Critical Assessment of the MAI, in REGULATING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, supranote 6, at 82;
Sol Picciotto, Linkages in InternationalInvestment Regulation: The Antinomies of the Draft MultilateralAgreement
on Investment, 19 U. PA.J. INT'L ECON. L. 731 (1998).

36. See Scope and Definition, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements, at 6, U.N.
Doc. TD/UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/1 1/Vol. H (1999).
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of asset owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by an investor . . ." followed by an
illustrative, though not exclusive, list that covered both equity-based and contractual assets.
These included, inter alia, construction contracts, loans, claims to money or performance,
intellectual property rights, concessions, licences, and property-related contractual rights
37
such as leases or mortgages.
broad
support for an asset-based definition, certain delegations arAlthough there was
gued for the exclusion of portfolio investment, and others found it difficult to accept an
s
open definition." There was also concern over the extent of coverage given to investments
indirectly owned or controlled by investors of a party. Indirect ownership of investments
located outside an MAI country by investors from an MAI country would be covered, as
would investments located in an MAI country owned and controlled by an investor located
in a non-MAI country. This approach would permit MNEs to manage their capital flows
in a flexible manner utilising their transnational network of affiliates as they saw fit. On the
other hand, some delegations favoured a denial of benefits clause, which would exclude
investors who lacked a substantial business presence in an MAI country from the protection
9
of the Agreement. Many issues remained unresolved, and the text refers to further work
being needed in the areas of indirect investment, intellectual property, concessions, public
debt, and real estate.
2. Extension to Pre-entry Protection
The draft MAI would require the progressive liberalisation of rights of entry and establishment. This was in line with the policy of the OECD Codes on Liberalisation and
followed the precedent set by NAFTA and in BITs negotiated by the United States, and
4°
more recently, Canada. Historically, states have reacted differently to such proposals.
While advocating greater liberalisation for outward investment, many states may prefer to
restrict the flow of inward investment for protectionist purposes. Economic unions, such
as the EU, may want the right to liberalise faster for internal investors than for investors
4
from outside the economic union. ' Federal states may encounter internal political objecthe
effect that an MAI could curtail their local competence
to
tions from federal subdivisions
2
and discretion in formulating inward investment policy4 A similar problem could confront
43
local authority initiatives. Developing countries in particular may prefer to exercise caution in relation to inward investment and thus to retain screening powers on entry so as to

37. MAI Consolidated Text, mpra note 35, at 11.
38. See Lessons, supra note 35, at 11.
39. MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 35, at 6-7.
40. See Admission and Establishment, supra note 9, at 23-28. Other regional investment agreements have
followed this approach albeit with variations such as transitional periods. See MERCOSUR Decision 11/93, in
COMPENDIUM, supra note 16, vol. H at 513; ASEAN Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area,
1998, in id. vol. V at 227. For side agreements, see Energy Charter Treaty, arts. 10(2)-(4), inCOMPENDIUM,
supra note 16, vol. H at 555.
41. See infra notes 76-78.
42. Such concerns led one delegation to propose an additional clause ensuring that where a sub-federal
entity offers more favourable treatment to its investors and investments, as compared to that offered by other
sub-federal entities, the more favourable treatment should be extended to foreign investors and investments
under the national treatment standard. See MAI Consolidated Text, supra note 35, at 129.
43. See Robert Nurick, The MAI: PotentialImpacts on Local Economic Development and Poverty Issues in the UK,
OXFAM, Mar. 1998; World Development Movement, The Impact of the MultilateralAgreement on Investment on
Local Government in the UK (1998).
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protect indigenous infant industries from excessive competition on the part of powerful
MNEs. Indeed, most BITs, with the exception of the above-mentioned U.S. and Canadian
models, follow an investment control approach, based on the right of the receiving state to
regulate the entry of foreign investors in accordance with national laws and regulations,
and do not contain entry and establishment rights. 4
Clearly, rights of entry and establishment would not be accepted without significant
exceptions. Many restrictions on the rights of foreign investors may be regarded as entirely
legitimate; the most obvious examples being restrictions based on public health, order,
morals, or strategic and defence grounds. Indeed, the draft MAI contained provisions embodying such general exceptions. In addition, it gave contracting states the right to enter
country-specific exceptions. 4 Numerous country-specific exceptions were put forward by
states, resulting in what some have called a "Swiss cheese" agreement, with more "holes"
than the negotiators originally expected. This has been explained on the ground that many
exceptions taken by states were mere bargaining counters, to be discarded on the gaining
of concessions.46 However, the large number of exceptions may reflect the "top-down"
approach taken in the MAI.
The extension of rights of entry and establishment can be achieved in an IIA in one of
two basic ways: by stating the right and allowing exceptions thereto-the "top-down" approach favoured in the MAI draft; or by giving states the discretion to open up specific
sectors as and when they feel ready to do so-the "bottom-up" approach. This is the
approach taken in GATS, where contracting states are not bound to offer entry and establishment rights to investors from other contracting states.47 Rather, by articles XVI and
XVII of that agreement, they are given the discretion to specify which sectors will be subject
to market access rights, and the extent to which full national treatment will apply. This
approach may be more attractive to states that are hesitant to enter into broad commitments
regarding entry and establishment. The "top-down" approach of the MAI, by contrast,
places liberalisation of entry conditions at the heart of the agreement. The only sure course
of action for a state concerned not to give too much away may be to lodge extensive general
and country-specific exceptions so as to preserve existing national regulations, and hence
host country discretion, over entry and establishment. The result is often an unwieldy
agreement in which the exceptions serve to complicate its scope and interpretation. NAFTA
is a case in point.48 Furthermore, once country-specific exceptions have been made, in the
absence of a transitional period within which such exceptions must be removed, the effect
of the agreement may be to entrench them, thereby defeating the aim of progressive liberalisation. Even if a transitional period exists, it is quite likely that, in practice, it will be
extended where the contracting states do not feel ready to espouse full liberalisation. Indeed,
this issue continued to be a matter of discussion with no final agreement being reached on
how the MAI would achieve its avowed aim of "rollback" on nonconforming, countryspecific measures. 49 The sheer number and range of exceptions submitted by delegates to
44. See Admission and Establishment,supra note 9, at 18.
45. See MAI Consolidated Text, supra note 35, at 77-80 and 90.
46. See Lessons, supra note 35, at 12.
47. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Dec. 5, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 44.
48. See Michael Gestrin & Alan Rugman, The North American Free Trade Agreement and Foreign Direct
Investment, 3 TRANSNAT'L CoRp. 77 (1994); The NAFTA Investment Provisions: Prototypefor MultilateralInvestment Rules, in OECD MARKET AcCESs AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND 63 (1996).
49. See MAI Consolidated Text, supra note 35, at 60.
VOL. 34, NO. 3

THE RISE & FALL OF MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT

1043

the MAI made it essential to develop a response that would guide the participants on how
to handle this matter. Unfortunately, there is little evidence that this was attempted, and it
may be one of the key reasons why the MAI failed.
3. Nondiscrimination
The nondiscrimination provision in the draft AIM concerned both national treatment
and MFN treatment. This portion respectively would have ensured treatment for foreign
investors "no less favourable" than that received by national investors or investors, from
other countries, whichever was the more favourable to the investor. The most controversial
issue was the extension of the nondiscrimination standard to rights of entry and establishment. As noted above, this raised the issue of exceptions. Other problems that were not
resolved concerned the scope of the nondiscrimination standard itself. At the outset, it is
worth noting that these two aspects of nondiscrimination were discussed as a combined
standard. This may have led to an overemphasis on national treatment issues, which are
inherently more sensitive than issues relating to the MFN standard. In particular, as noted
by a recent UNCTAD study on MFN treatment:
Exceptions to national treatment are more frequent than exceptions to MFN. This reflects the
fact that countries find it more difficult to treat foreign and domestic investors equally than to
provide for equal treatment among investors from different home countries. Furthermore,
there may be special situations in which a privileged treatment of domestic enterprises can be
justified.'5
It may have been better to discuss each standard in a separate provision, so as to ensure
that MFN status would not be overwhelmed by national treatment issues. Indeed this is
the approach of the GATS, where MFN status is a general obligation under Article -I,
while
national treatment is an optional obligation under Article XVII.
As regards the content of the nondiscrimination standard, two closely related questions
had to be answered: first, what were the factual situations in which the standard applied,
and secondly, what technique of comparison should be adopted in order to determine when
foreign investors or their investments were being discriminated against. As to the first issue,
the draft MAI referred to "establishment, acquisition, expansion, maintenance, use, enjoyment and sale or other disposition of investments."'" This formulation was considered by
several delegations to be a comprehensive one whose terms were designed to cover all
activities of investors and their investments for both the pre- and post-establishment phases.
Other delegations favoured a closed list of investment activities covered by the nondiscrimination standard. Others objected to this approach on the grounds that, while such
a list has the advantage of certainty, it could omit elements that were of importance to the
investor.2 A related issue concerned whether or not to include a qualifying phrase "in like
circumstances." No agreement was reached on its inclusion. Some delegations thought that
national treatment and MFN status implicitly provided the comparative context for determining whether a measure unduly treated foreign investors and their investments differently, and that the inclusion of the words was unnecessary and open to abuse. Other dele-

50.
at 31,
51.
52.

Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements,
U.N. Doc. TD/UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/10/Vol.II (1999).
MAI Consolidated Text, supra
note 35, at 13.
See MAI Negotiating Text, supra note 35, at 11.
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gations thought the comparative context should be indicated, following the practice of the
OECD National Treatment Instrument, some BITs, and NAFTA.53 As to the second question, the formulation adopted in the MAI Negotiating Text included the phrase "treatment
no less favourable." 4 This opens the possibility for treatment that may be in practice more
favourable for foreign, as compared to national, investors and investments, as where, for
example, the treatment of national investors falls below international minimum standards.5
In this light there was discussion as to whether the "same" or "comparable" treatment
approach should be used. However, the majority of delegates considered that this would
56
unacceptably weaken the standard of treatment from the investor's viewpoint.
4. PerformanceRequirements
The MAI would have made the imposition of performance requirements as a condition
of entry and establishment subject to extensive prohibitions." In particular, it would have
prohibited the following: trade-related requirements dealing with the ratio of export sales
to total sales, domestic content and local purchasing rules, and the ratio of local sales to
exports; transfer of technology requirements, except where imposed under competition
laws; location of headquarters requirements; requirements to supply goods or services to a
specific region or the world market exclusively from the host country; local research and
development targets; mandatory employment of nationals; establishment of a joint venture
with domestic participation; and minimum and maximum levels of foreign equity participation. Trade-related performance requirements would have been absolutely prohibited,
while the other categories could be allowed where they were linked to advantages granted
in connection with an investment in the territory of the host contracting party.
All of these policies entail a discretion in economic planning that might be used to favour
national investors. Indeed, performance requirements can be justified as a means of ensuring
fair competition between MNEs and local firms in the domestic market, and may be used
to stimulate exports from developing countries by MNEs.58 This was one of the issues
picked up by NGOs who feared that the MAI could weaken such regulatory discretions to
the disadvantage of the host state. On the other hand, controls over performance requirements can be justified on the basis that such measures do little but introduce burdens on
investors that would not have been undertaken in the absence of compulsion. They are said
to represent a second-best policy of market intervention that increases investment costs and
may deter investors from the country in question, or force them to operate their investment
at less than full efficiency29 This theoretical debate has never been fully resolved, leading
to concern over attempts to control state discretions in this area. Indeed, delegations treated
the matter with caution given the absolute nature of the obligations and the complexity of
the matters at issue. 60 The controversial nature of these matters is further emphasized by

53. Id.
54. MAI Consolidated Text, supra note 35, at 13.
55. See NationalTreatment, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements, at 37, U.N.
Doc. TD/UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/I I/Vol. IV (1999).
56. See MAI Negotiating Text, supra
note 35, at 10.
57. MAI Consolidated Text, supra
note 35, at 18-26.
58. See Theodore H. Moran, The Impact of TRlMs on Trade and Development, 1 TRANSNAT'L CORP. 55 (1992);
Picciotto, supra note 35, at 751.
59. See Moran, supra note 58.
60. See Lessons, upra note 35, at 16.
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the fact that the related issue of incentives was postponed for discussion after the adoption
of the MAI. Had this been included on the agenda, the very right of a subnational authority,
with constitutional powers over investment matters to offer incentives, would have been
put into question. 61 This would have been politically impossible to justify especially in
countries with powerful subnational entities such as the United States and Canada. Furthermore, the exclusion of controls on incentives, coupled with the inclusion of controls
on performance requirements, would have unbalanced the MAI in relation to developing
countries. These countries have tended to use performance requirements in their economic
policy making, while developed countries have tended to prefer incentives. Both types of
distorting measures should have been placed under MAI disciplines if the aim was to exclude
all measures capable of distorting economic efficiency. As it was, the MAI, like the VVTO
TRIM Agreement before it, would have acted more vigorously against the practices of
developing countries in this area.
5. Provisions on Epropriation
The MAI provision on expropriation sought to include the international minimum standards that had become commonplace in BITs. However, its scope was controversial in that
it covered not only direct but indirect takings.62 This approach could cause significant
problems for countries with strong regulatory regimes as any act of regulation that limits
the capacity of an investment to make profits could be seen as an indirect taking of property.
This caused much discussion leading to the proposal that an interpretative note be added
to the text explaining that the expropriation provision does not "establish a new requirement
that Parties pay compensation, for losses which an investor or investment might incur
through regulation, revenue raising and other normal activity in the public interest under63
taken by governments."
On the other hand, the provisions on taxation make clear that the provisions on expropriation will apply to taxation measures that amount to outright or "creeping" expropriation, but not if the measure is "generally within the bounds of internationally recognised
tax policies and practices." 64
6. Dispute Settlement Provisions
These were among the most controversial aspects of the MAI. The draft contained a
chapter on dispute settlement covering both state-to-state and investor-state disputes. 6 The
latter in particular gave rise to difficulties. It would have granted to foreign investors special
rights to challenge national decisions concerning the observance of the substantive provisions of the MAI. In particular, failing to settle the dispute by negotiation or consultation,
the investor would be free to choose to submit it for resolution to any competent courts or

61. See id. at 17.
62. According to the MAI Consolidated Text, "A Contracting Party shall not expropriate or nationalise
directly or indirectly an investment in its territory of an investor of another Contracting Party or take any
measure or measures having equivalent effect ... except.., for a purpose which is in the public interest...
on a non-discriminatory basis... in accordance with due process of law.., accompanied by payment of prompt,
adequate and effective compensation ....MAI Consolidated Text, supra note 35, at 57.
63. Id. at 144. Significantly, this formulation is to be found in the Annex containing the package of proposals
for text on environment and labour.
64. Id. at 87.
65. Id. at 63-76.
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administrative authorities of the Contracting Party to the dispute. Resolution would be in
accordance with any dispute settlement procedure agreed upon prior to the dispute arising
or by arbitration, in accordance with the procedural provisions of this MAI article, under
ICSID, the ICSID Additional Facility, the Arbitration Rules of UNCITRAL, or the ICC
Rules of Arbitration.
This approach to dispute settlement is not new. It has become a standard feature in As.
For example, most BITs contain an investor-state dispute settlement provision that encourages amicable settlement, with third party settlement, such as arbitration before an
international arbitral body, as a last resort. Similar provisions can be found in NAFTA,
MERCOSUR, and the Energy Charter Treaty.66 However, the NGOs saw this provision
-and similar formulations in other ILAs-as giving foreign investors special privileges that
enabled them to neutralise legitimate national laws and regulations by claiming before an
international tribunal that they violated the protective standards of the IIA.
Much was made of the recent case brought by the Ethyl Corporation against Canada
under the dispute settlement provisions of NAFTA. Ethyl claimed that a Canadian law
banning the importation of the gasoline additive MMT into Canada violated its rights as
an investor under that agreement. This case eventually settled in July 1998 with Canada
lifting the import ban and paying $13 million to Ethyl. 67 The NGOs saw this case as an
example of how the provisions of NAFTA could be used to invalidate a measure based
on environmental concerns. 6s Similar objections were made by one delegation, while
others voiced opposition to the extension of the dispute settlement procedure to the preestablishment phase.69 Numerous unresolved questions remained after the negotiations had
finished, including the question of the role of local remedies, the scope of reservations, and
of the principle of unconditional prior consent to the MAI system.75 A number of delegations were left feeling that much work was still needed on dispute settlement.
C.

OTHER

"DEAL

BREAKERS"

The preceding discussion has centered on the main areas of disagreement within topics
that could be regarded as part of the conventional content of IAs. In this section, a number
of further issues are considered. They all share the common features of going beyond the
conventional content and of being highly controversial, but yet incapable of being excluded
from the agenda due to the insistence of one or more delegations that had a special interest
in the matter. By contrast, other issues that could have raised serious controversies, namely
taxation, intellectual property, and incentives, were either left out after initial debates or
reserved for future discussion." Negotiations had also taken place concerning the extension

66. See Lessons, supra note 35, at 19. On investor state dispute settlement generally, see MUCHLINSK, supra
note 10, ch. 15.
67. The case is reported in relation to the jurisdictional issues under NAFTA. See NAFTA Chapter II
Arbitral Tribunal: Ethyl Corporation v. Canada (Decision Regarding the Place of Arbitration), Nov. 28,1997,
38 I.L.M. 700.
68. Another recent case that has received similar attention concerns the U.S. Metalclad Corporation's claim
under NAFTA against Mexico. See Matthew Nolan & Darin Lippoldt, Obscure NAFTA Clause Empowers Private
Parties, NAT'L LJ., Apr. 1998, at B8.
69. See Lessons, supra note 35, at 19.
70. See MAI consolidated Text, supra note 35, at 38-39.
71. Taxation was carved out of the MAI, except in relation to expropriation and transparency commitments,
so as to avoid clashes with double taxation agreements; intellectual property discussions were left at the stage
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73
of nondiscrimination to privatisations" and to monopolies/state enterprises/concessions.
While financial services were included in view of their special regulatory demands, this
necessitated the clarification of the scope of state discretion in this area so that it could be
exercised in conformity with the treatment provisions of the MAI"5 In none of these fields
was there final agreement at the time negotiations were suspended.
Four such "deal-breakers" were introduced into the agenda: in the light of the controversy
over the Helms-Burton Act, the issues of the extraterritorial application of investmentrelated national laws and of the establishment of international disciplines to deal with the
use of confiscated foreign-owned property; the regional economic integration organisation
(REIO) exception to the nondiscrimination standard; the "cultural industries" exception;
and labour and environmental standards.

1. New Disciplineson the Treatment of Illegally Confiscated Property
In the course of MAI negotiations, the United States tried to introduce new disciplines
concerning the rights of owners of illegally expropriated property to pursue claims against
its current owners. This emerged out of the controversy generated by the Helms-Burton
Act 75 that sought to recover claims concerning property owned in Cuba by U.S. nationals,
taken at the time of the Cuban revolution, and which was now owned by firms from other

countries, mainly Europe, Canada, and Mexico. In May 1998, an understanding was reached
on these issues between the U.S. and EU leaders, though with significant restrictions as to
its scope. In the end, two alternative, country-specific proposals for new drafts existed, one
on conflicting requirements and one on secondary investment boycotts. The first would
prevent a Contracting Party from prohibiting outside its territory an investor from another
Contracting Party from acting in accordance with that other Contracting Party's laws,
regulations, or express policies, unless these were contrary to international law. The second
would prohibit the Contracting Parties from taking measures that impose liability on investors or investments of investors from another Contracting Party, or prohibit or impose
sanctions for dealing with investors of another Contracting Party because of investments
an investor of another Contracting Party makes, owns, or controls, directly or indirectly,
76
in a third country in accordance with the regulations of such third country.
2. The REIO Exception
The nondiscrimination provision of the MAI had the potential to create a "free rider"
problem. By relying on that provision, MAI contracting states could enjoy the benefits of
a REIO, whose membership consisted of parties to the MAI, without being members of
that organization. To deal with this problem, the EU proposed that a REIO exception be
included in the MAI." There remained considerable disagreement as to the scope of such

that a separate provision excluding the application of the nondiscrimination standard beyond the scope of
existing commitments in intellectual property conventions would be inserted into the MAI, and incentives
would have been discussed after the adoption of the MAI. See MAI Consolidated Text, supra note 35, at
46-48, 50-52, and 87-89.
72. See id. at 27-31.
73. See id. at 32-45.
74. See id. at 81-86.
75. See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110
Stat. 785 (1996); Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (1996).
76. See MAI Consolidated Text, supra note 35, at 122-27.
77. See id. at 118-19; see alsoJoachim Karl, MultilateralInvestment Agreements and Regional EconomicIntegration, 5 TRANSNAT'L CORP. 19 (1996).
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a clause at the time negotiations were suspended. Some delegations thought that this proposal struck at the very objectives of the MAI, which included the gaining of market access
to REIOs on a par with access by investors from the member countries of such organizations. On the other hand, as the EU had argued, membership in such organizations carried
with it additional obligations that nonmembers did not carry, such as, for example, the
acceptance of majority voting, and extension to areas not covered by the MAI, such as the
recognition of diplomas. To extend the benefits of membership to nonmembers in such
circumstances would be very difficult.7"
3. The CulturalIndustriesException
This exception would preserve the right of a Contracting Party to take any measure to
regulate investment of foreign companies and the conditions of activity of those companies
in the framework of policies designed to preserve and promote cultural and linguistic diversity. 9 This exception was championed by France and Canada in particular, who feared
an "Americanisation" of global media industries. It was strongly opposed by U.S. media
interests. The issues remained unresolved at the time the MAI negotiations were suspended.
4. Labour and EnvironmentalStandards
Initially, the MAI was not to have included labour and environmental standards. However, in response to extensive lobbying by NGOs and trade unions,80 some general provisions were included in the preamble and an additional labour and environment clause was
proposed by the Chairman of the Negotiating Conference in Annex 2 to the Draft Agreement.8" The clause concentrated on the need for a balanced relationship between the MAI
disciplines and other areas of public policy, and on the avoidance of unintended consequences of normal regulatory practices. In particular, it was noted that the inclusion of the
"in like circumstances" formulation in the nondiscrimination provision would address the
problem of de facto discrimination where a measure, not specifically aimed at foreign investors or investments, would have the practical effect of treating them less favourably
compared to domestic and/or other foreign investors or investments. The principal aim
was to ensure that the MAI did not inhibit normal, nondiscriminatory governmental regulatory activity in these areas. Another aspect of this issue was the proposed inclusion of a
"no lowering of standards" clause, which would have ensured that countries could not use
a lowering of labour, environment, or health standards as incentives for inward investment.82
However, the precise content of that clause was never agreed upon and it remained subject
to many drafting alternatives.
III. Analysis: Lessons for the Future
The problems described above proved fatal to the conclusion of the MAI. On October
14, 1998, French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin stated that France would take no further
part in the negotiations on the ground that the MAI, as currently formulated, represented

78. See Lessons, supra note 35, at 14-15.
79. See MAI Consolidated Text, supra note 35, at 128.
80. See also HENDERSON, supra note 30, at 22 and 27-28; Nick Mabey, Defending the Legacy of Rio: The Civil
Society CampaignAgainst the MAI, in REGULATING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, supra note 6, at 60.
81. MAI Consolidated Text, supra note 35, at 140-45.
82. Seeid. at 54.
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an unacceptable threat to national sovereignty. s3 A week later, on October 22, the senior
representatives of the OECD Members and the European Commission convened in the
Executive Committee of the Special Session of the OECD in Paris. They announced that
they would now proceed with further consultations on the controversies that the negotiating
4
process had raised, thereby effectively ending the negotiations on the MAI.1
There is much debate on the actual causes of this failure. The political opposition to the
Agreement generated by the NGO community undoubtedly made a significant contribution
by raising awareness of its one-sided nature, and by offering an organised critique based on
the unaccountability of MNEs and of the multilateral economic organisations that were
trying to introduce the MA. This view of events continues to make the adoption of future
multilateral rules in this area politically difficult. However, the principal reason lies in the
conception of the agreement as a pure investor and investment protection instrument. This
made the agreement an anachronism from the start. The MAI was based on fundamental
misconceptions as to the nature of transnational economic interactions in an era of increased
privatisation and deregulation at the national level. Thus, the MAI started from the false
premise that governmental power to control business had to be curtailed. It lived in a world
dominated by old political agendas signified by the "right/left" axis of Cold War politics,
in which the principal concerns of foreign direct investors were to preserve existing investments in recently decolonised and/or increasingly politically assertive host countries.
The new political environment no longer places "right/left" issues of ownership and
control at centre stage. Rather, there has been a transformation in political discourse, which
challenges not the legitimacy and value of free private enterprise as such, but its legitimacy
as a polluter, an abuser of market power, a corruptor of state officials, an exploiter of
workers, and a potential accomplice to violations of fundamental human rights. Thus, the
correct starting point should have been an acknowledgement that, in this new investment

83. See France Quits Investment Accord Talks on MultilateralAgreement, Jospin Says Structure 'Not Open to
Reform' and Sovereignty Threatened, FIN. TIMEs, Oct. 15, 1998, at 5; see also HENOERSON, supra note 30, at 3031. For the full debate, see Assemblbe Nationale, Session Ordinaire de 1998-1999 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1998),
available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/2/cra/2aa.htm. The Prime Minister's official statement followed
the recommendations of a Special Commission appointed in May 1998 to examine the MAI under the chair
of Catherine Lalumiere, MEP, and Jean-Pierre Landau, Inspector General of Finances. This body concluded
that, while France should continue to press for new negotiations, this should only be done on the fulfillment
of at least seven major conditions:
* the definition of FDI exclude portfolio investment and financial market operations;
* the dispute settlement provisions be confined to interstate disputes;
* the words "full and constant protection and security" under the heading"General Treatment
of Investments be deleted;"
* the words "measures having equivalent effect" in the draft expropriation clause be deleted;
* the restrictions on performance requirements be limited to an extension of the TRIMS provisions to services;
* the right to bring back reservations be subject to compensation for other Contracting Parties
as in the WTO; and
* final agreement be conditional on the accession of a sufficient number of non-OECD countries.
84. See Press Release, Chairman's Statement Under Secretary of State Stuart Eizenstat (USA) Executive
Committee in Special Session (Oct. 23, 1998), available at http://www.oecd.org/media/release/nw98-101a.htm.
The negotiations were formally ended in a further informal OECD Meeting in December 1998. See HENDERSON, supra note 30, at 32.
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environment, new regulatory issues, of the kinds listed above, emerge.81 It was the complete
failure to address these new questions that undermined the MAI, based as it was on models
of IIAs that were, in effect, a response to increased state intervention and control over the
national economy through nationalisations and highly interventionist national economic
plans. In the light of the foregoing, a number of conclusions can be drawn.
First, as to the negotiating process, any future multilateral initiative must be made more
representative in terms of the participating countries. The active involvement of developing
countries and countries in transition is essential. Their exclusion through the choice of the
OECD as the negotiating forum was based on a suspicion as to their motives for being
skeptical about new multilateral investment disciplines, a feeling that seemed to have been
based on historical patterns of behaviour now largely abandoned by these countries in their
search for inward FDI. It is perhaps ironic that a major reason for the failure of the negotiations was the fact that many of the OECD member countries had themselves not
achieved a fully liberalised environment for inward FDI, as exemplified by the extensive
reservations to the Code on the Liberalisation of Capital Movements 6 and the many
country-specific exceptions to the MAI. These reservations and exceptions made OECD
members unable to agree to the text.
The developing countries must come fully armed to the negotiating table. The
UNCTAD programme on issues in hAs seeks to achieve this purpose. It involves regional
seminars for developing country officials, the publication of specialised issues papers as guides
to negotiators, and ongoing analysis of the development implications of IlAs, focused on the
concept of "flexibility for development."" T Furthermore, to counter the perceived lack of civic
input into the original negotiations, provision should be made for representatives of civil
society to be officially involved in the negotiations as advisers and not merely as observers.
However, the ultimate responsibility for concluding binding rules must rest with governments
as the only legitimate and accountable representatives of their populations.s
As to venue, the WTO continues to be mentioned as a possibility, given its wide membership. However, some groups have expressed caution given its commitment to free trade.
They would welcome a more pluralistic venue, possibly within the United Nations. Another
alternative might be to establish a specialist negotiating forum, composed of inputs from
the WTO, UNCTAD, and other relevant intergovernmental organisations.
As to content, the draft MAI was criticised as displaying an imbalance between investor
rights and responsibilities. This prompted NGOs, unions, consumer groups, and others to
campaign for the introduction of tougher responsibilities for investors. This may entail a
binding section on investor responsibilities, which, while covering many of the same issues,
would go beyond the mere appending of the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises in a nonbinding Annex. Numerous NGO proposals for a code based on such an
approach have been formulated and may be a useful guide to negotiators.89
85. On which, see further the interesting paper by Arghyrios A. Fatouros, InternationallnvestmentAgreements
and Development-Problems and Prospects at the Turn of the Century, in LIBER AMICORUM PROFESSORSEIDLHOHENVELDERN- IN HONOUR OF His 80TH BIRTHDAY 115 (Gerhard Hafner et al. eds., 1998).
86. See supra note 13, Annex B (both Codes).
87. See UNCTAD'S Work Programmeon InternationalInvestment Agreements: From UNCTAD IX, Midrand
(1996), to UNCTAD X, Bangkok (2000) (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, United
Nations 2000); see UNCTAD Flexibility: UNCTAD Series on Issues in InternationalInvestment Agreements (forthcoming).
88. See HENDERSON, supra note 30, at 57-60.
89. See, e.g., UNCTAD COMPENDIUM vol. V (forthcoming 2000); Human Rights Guidelinesfor Companies
(Amnesty International-The Business Group, London, England), 1998.

VOL. 34, NO. 3

THE RISE & FALL OF MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT

1051

Secondly, with further awareness of the need for "flexibility for development," the very
structure, objectives, substantive rules and modes of implementation, and monitoring of
future multilateral investment rules should ensure that there is a balance between the protection of investors and the interests of countries, especially developing countries. Such
future rules must avoid falling into the pitfall of the MAI, which recognised only the "legal
symmetry" of the contracting parties, thereby assuming that all countries were formally
equal under the law of the Agreement. However, with the active participation of developing
countries, such "legal symmetry" cannot co-exist with the reality of "economic asymmetry"
without exposing developing countries to the risk of damaging competition from, often
stronger, foreign investors, including MNEs. Thus, the very structure, content, and organisation of the agreement should aim at minimizing "economic asymmetry" through provisions that ensure respect for the legitimate development needs of countries. This may
require the introduction of transitional provisions, commitments to cooperation, and technical assistance provisions. 90
Thirdly, the failure of the MAI shows that even the developed countries cannot agree on
a "fast-track" liberalisation agreement. The major lesson is that negotiation of a MAI-type
agreement is not a zero-sum game, with either full liberalisation or full protectionism as
the possible outcomes. Perhaps the inevitable result will be an agreement with some liberalisation and some protectionism, much like the current example of NAFTA. One way
around this, as noted above, could be to abandon the MAT's commitment to liberalisation
coupled with "top-down" lists of exceptions, and to adopt the more cautious approach of
selective liberalisation whereby a country "opts-in" to liberalisation by specifying the sectors
in which it is willing to accept such disciplines while leaving nonspecified sectors outside
the agreement. Equally, clear rules must be agreed to concerning the treatment of countryspecific exceptions, which balance the desire for liberalisation against the legitimate concerns of states to protect their sovereign discretion. For example, the WTO practice of
allowing the restoration of reservations on payment of compensation to other contracting
parties, as advocated by the French Lalumiere Report on the MAI, 91 might be considered.
Furthermore, recent developments in arbitral jurisprudence suggest that any future dispute settlement mechanism will have to operate within the limits of international law, which
should act as a check against excessive claims made against host countries by investors. In
particular, in the recent NAFTA case of Azanian v. United Mexican States,92 the tribunal
held that a claim against the termination of a contractual concession to supply solid refuse
collection and disposal services to a local authority in Mexico could not amount to an
expropriatory taking in violation of Chapter 11 of NAFTA where the Mexican authorities
had not acted in violation of international law standards. Such a violation could not be
surmised simply from the fact that the investor had suffered a breach of contract at the
hands of the host state's authorities. Indeed, on the facts of the present case, the alleged
breach had been reviewed by three levels of Mexican courts, and in none of these was the
alleged breach made out. Thus, in the absence of proof that the Mexican courts had themselves acted in breach of Chapter 11, by violating the international legal standard of due
process through a denial of justice or pretense of form, the claimant's case failed. It follows

90. For a detailed discussion and illustrative examples, see UNCTAD Flexibility, supra note 87.

91. See Lalumiere, sipra note 83.
92. Azinian v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2 (Nov. 1,
1999).
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that only in the most serious cases of alleged violations of multilateral investment rules
should an international dispute settlement body be used.
Moreover, in the recent WTO dispute settlement body decision concerning the white
asbestos dispute between Canada and France, the WTO Panel upheld the right of the
French authorities to ban the importation of white asbestos from Canada on the basis of
the scientific assessment of the health risks involved on the part of the experts consulted by
the Panel. 93 Though not too much should be read into this decision, this signals a move
away from the type of problem perceived to have arisen in the Ethyl case. Any future dispute
settlement mechanism will have to take account of the legitimate interests of the host state
in regulating the activities of foreign investors. Such regulation does not in itself constitute
an infringement of international investment protection rules. That was implicit in the discussions on this issue under the MAI. Now it would appear that arbitral tribunals have made
explicit this qualification on the rights of investors.
Finally, linkages with other issues such as labour standards, human rights, environmental
protection, competition, taxation, and intellectual property will have to be tackled to ensure
that future multilateral investment rules do not interfere in a way that undermines existing
international obligations of states in these areas. 94 In this regard, a new debate.has arisen
among NGOs. On September 15, 1999, a new group of academics and NGOs from developing countries issued a "Statement Against Linkage."9o This calls for the de-linking of
environmental and labour questions from any future multilateral rules on investment, and
their remaining within specialised bodies such as the ILO on the ground that these constitute no more than hidden protectionism by developed countries against developing countries that may have lower standards in these areas. This position has been vigorously opposed by, among others, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.96 However,
given the existence of a Trade and Environment Working Group in the WTO, and the
growing concern over corporate responsibilities generated by Western NGOs, it is likely
that this wider agenda will remain within that organisation.
In conclusion, certain wider implications of the lessons from the failure of the MAI should
be highlighted. First, the lessons of the MAI go further than the W'TO. Numerous bilateral
investment agreements continue to be negotiated, as do new regional investment agreements, a notable recent example being the ASEAN Framework Agreement on an ASEAN
Investment Area of 1998. 91 The scope and development of such hAs need to reflect the
experience gained under the MAI so as to create a new generation of agreement types that

93. See Scott Morrison & Frances Williams, WTO Upholds White Asbestos Ban, Trade Ruling Panel Reects
Canadian Claim After Scientists Agree the Material Is Carcinogenic,FIN. TIMES, June 15, 2000, at 14. For background, see Sam Zia-Zarifi, The Vital Issues in theWTO Asbestos Dispute, TUTB NEWSL. (European Trade
Union Technical Bureau for Health and Safety, Brussels, BeIg.), March 2000, at 3-5.
94. See also Picciotto, supra note 35.
95. Third World Intellectuals and NGOs Statement Against Linkage (TWIN-SAL) (Consumer Unity & Trust
Society, India), Sept. 15, 1999, available at http://www.cuts-india.org/wto-campaign.htm. This initiative has
been strongly influenced by the thinking of one of the Statement's signatories, Jagdish Bhagwati, on which, see
furtherJAonISH N. BHAGWATI, FREE TRAoE, FAIRNESS AND THE NEW PROTECTIONISM: SOME REFLECTIONS ON
AN AGENDA FOR THE WORLo TRADE ORGANISATION (Institute of Economic Affairs, Occasional Paper 96, 1995).
96. See Enough Exploitation Is Enough: A Response to the Third World Intellectuals and NGOs StatementAgainst
Linkage (TVWIN-SAL) (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Brussels, BeIg.), Sept. 29, 1999.
97. See ASEAN Framework Agreement, supra note 40.
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are more development oriented and more sensitive to environmental and social issues.
Secondly, in regard to the United Kingdom's policy in this area, the Department of Trade
and Industry (DTI) itself asked the question of whether there is a high priority for action
on investor protection rules based on nondiscrimination given the existing network of bi98
lateral investment agreements. On the other hand, the DTI believes that there is scope
for action to create a single, transparent, nondiscrimination framework that preserves the
99
right of governments to pursue their social, environmental, and economic objectives.
Should the government pursue such an objective, it is crucial that it carries a truly representative voice into negotiations. To this end, it may be necessary to establish improved
systems of policy development, building on the informal networks already in existence, and
accounting for not only the views of civil society, but the views of local and regional interests
in relation to inward investment. This is given greater weight in the light of the establishment of Regional Development Agencies and of the devolution of inward investment issues
to the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly. It may require more formal structures than
exist at present for inputs from the regions (for example, in the work of the DTI's Industrial
Development Unit) and a degree of regional representation on negotiating teams. In this
way, a more balanced and acceptable position on a future multilateral framework for the
regulation of investment may emerge.

98. See DTI InternationalInvestment: The Next Steps, July 12, 1999, at 1 12. These views are in contrast to
the more positive stance taken on the need for multilateral investment rules by Clare Short, the Secretary of
State for Overseas Development, see supra note 5. A view similar to that expressed by the DTI was echoed by
the Business and Industry Advisory Committee of the OECD when it became apparent that the MAI negotiations were stalling.
99. See id. at 45.
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